Mark-Up Pricing in Bulgarian Manufacturing by Dobrinsky, Rumen et al.
Mark-Up Pricing in Bulgarian Manufacturing
By: Rumen Dobrinsky, Boyko Nikolov, and Nikolay Markov
William Davidson Working Paper Number 389
June 2001Rumen Dobrinsky
*), Boyko Nikolov, Nikolay Markov
**)
MARK-UP PRICING IN BULGARIAN MANUFACTURING
ABSTRACT
The pricing policy of Bulgarian manufacturing firms is analysed in the paper in the
context of the theory of the price-setting behaviour of firms endowed with market power, and
more specifically, using the notion of mark-up pricing.  Using some recent derivations in the
literature, we estimate mark-up ratios for Bulgarian manufacturing sectors at the NACE 2-
digit and NACE 3-digit levels.  The estimated mark-ups are then tested against a set of
variables measuring the degree of competitive pressure on a sectoral level.
JEL Classification numbers: C23, D21, D24
Keywords: mark-up pricing; competitive pressure; enterprise restructuring and adjustment,
Bulgaria
*) UN Economic Commission for Europe; Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva
    tel. (+41 22) 917 2487; fax: (+41 22) 917 0309; e-mail: rumen.dobrinsky@unece.org
**) Centre for Economic and Strategic Research; 7, Akad. Nikola Obreshkov str., vh. B, ap. 5
   Sofia 1113, Bulgaria; tel. (+359 2) 971 2905, 973 3267; fax: (+359 2) 971 2871
   e-mail: nmarkov@mail.ibn.bg ; ndochev@mail.ibn.bg
This research was undertaken with support from the European Community’s Phare ACE
Programme (ACE Project P97-8131-R “Competitive Pressure and enterprise Adjustment on
the Way to EU Accession”). The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and
not of the organizations they are affiliated with.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 389
1
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The pricing behaviour of Bulgarian manufacturing firms is analyzed in the paper in
the context of the theory of the price-setting behaviour of firms endowed with market power,
more specifically, using the notion of mark-up pricing.  Under perfect competition and
assuming perfect markets, producers will sell their products in accordance with their marginal
costs.  Conversely, deviation from perfect competition and/or perfect markets can be
identified by the discrepancy between prices and marginal costs.  In the case when the
demand curve is downward sloping, this shift results in the formation of a price mark-up, i.e.,
a situation when the equilibrium price exceeds marginal cost.
Using some recent derivations in the literature (in particular, Roeger￿s (1995)
extension of Hall￿s (1988) original approach), we estimate mark-up ratios for Bulgarian
manufacturing sectors at the NACE 2-digit and NACE 3-digit levels.  We use for this purpose
balance sheet data for Bulgarian manufacturing enterprises for the period 1995-1997.  The
estimated numerical values of the mark-up ratios compare favourably with similar results for
other countries.
The mark-up ratio reflects the pricing policy of firms endowed with market power
who use that power to set prices higher than their marginal costs.  Looked from the opposite
angle, if the mark-up ratios are measurable, then they themselves can be regarded as
reflecting the degree of competition that firms are facing on the market.  To test this
conjecture, we formulate and estimate a ￿mark-up price equation￿ which seeks to explain the
cross-sector variation in mark-up ratios through variables measuring competitive pressure
within manufacturing sectors.  The estimated mark-up equations in the main provide
evidence supporting the conjecture that the stronger market competition is a conducive
environment for efficient price setting.  At the same time, some ambiguity remains as regards
the impact of some competition-related variables (such as ownership and exposure to external
markets) on the pricing policies of Bulgarian manufacturing firms.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 389
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1. Introduction
The existence of competitive markets is an essential prerequisite for productive
efficiency and a fundamental requirement for the efficient allocation of resources in the
economy; competitive pressure is also a major driving force for innovation at the firm level.
The fact that firms in the centrally planned economy operated in the absence of competitive
pressure was one of the main factors that contributed for the emergence of built-in allocative
and productive inefficiencies (x-inefficiency) and for the generally inefficient resource
allocation in these economies.  Thus a large part of the legislative, regulatory and institutional
reforms initiated and implemented in the CEECs during the past decade were aimed at the
creation of a competitive market environment.  This was an essential component of the policy
effort seeking to enhance the restructuring of enterprise and improve their productive
efficiency.
The start of the transition from plan to market in the CEECs in general was featured
(although to a varying degree in the different countries) by non-competitive markets, in
virtually all aspects outlined above.  Market structures were dominated by large, state-owned
firms that used to enjoy monopolistic or close to a monopolistic position on the local markets.
The degree of openness of the economies was limited, creating a cushion that shielded local
firms from competition from abroad.  Local product and factor markets were in a rudimentary
state, with prevailing state control over domestic prices.  Both entry and exit barriers were
overwhelming with very little, if any, room left for entrepreneurial activity.  All these, in turn,
cemented the market power of the large local firms.  The prevailing governance structure was
that of linear subordination to the central authorities while managerial incentives in the main
were dominated by the principles of the command economy.
Although enterprise restructuring was one of the areas of intense research, Relatively
few studies have analyzed the firms￿ pricing behaviour during the transition.  Under perfect
competition, the equilibrium on the goods market is established when the trading prices equal
the firms￿ marginal costs (put differently, this implies that firms adjust their cost structure so
that to set their marginal costs equal to the exogenous price level).  However, in the absence
of perfect competition, there may be deviations from this model of cost and price formation.
Carlin et al. (1999), on the basis of enterprise surveys, find some evidence of a positive
correlation between innovation and price mark-up but only in the case of new entrants to the
market.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 389
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2. Pricing behaviour under imperfect competition: Hall’s approach and Roeger’s
transformation
Under perfect competition and assuming perfect markets, producers will sell their
products in accordance with their marginal costs.
1  Conversely, deviation from perfect
competition and/or perfect markets can be identified by the discrepancy between prices and
marginal costs.  Hence, relaxing the assumption of perfect market competition allows to
analyze different pricing behaviour and policies of the firms.  One of the theoretical models
of price formation under the assumption of the existence of monopolistic or oligopolistic
market structure is that of ￿mark-up￿ pricing (Eichner, 1973; Lavoie, 1996).  As known from
theory, the presence of a monopolist endowed with market power may result in the shifting of
the equilibrium point from the position of perfect competition.  In the case when the demand
curve is downward sloping, this shift results in the formation of a price mark-up, i.e., a
situation when the equilibrium price exceeds marginal cost.  In other words, if the market
structure is characterized by the incidence of monopolistic/oligopolistic firms, the latter may
use their market power to set prices higher than their marginal costs, that is to establish a
￿mark-up￿ over the marginal costs:
(1) p = θ ￿
where p is product price, ￿ is marginal cost and θ is the mark-up ratio (θ  > 1).
As well known from theory, the mark-up ratio of a profit-maximizing monopolistic
firm facing a downward sloping demand curve, is derived in the following form:
(2) θ =  p/ ￿  = 1/(1 + 1/η)
where η is the price elasticity of demand.
Mark-up pricing can also be described by the so-called Lerner index:
(3) B = (p - ￿ )/p
By virtue of the above definitions:William Davidson Institute Working Paper 389
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(4) B = 1 ￿ 1/ θ ; θ = 1/(1 ￿ B)
Looked from a different perspective, the mark-up ratio can be regarded as a forward-
looking measure of the degree of competition that firms are facing on the market.  Thus Hall
(1988), starting from the assumption that price mark-ups emerge as a result of market power,
analyzes the implications of market power on productive efficiency, factor demand and
pricing behaviour.  For this purpose he derives the Solow residual in the case of imperfect
competition and/or markets, when product price does not necessarily equal marginal cost.
Hall shows that in this case the difference between the rate of growth of nominal output and
the weighted average of factor inputs is not solely attributed to autonomous technical change
but may partly reflect monopolistic pricing policy.
This approach is illustrated in the following framework.  Assume that output is
defined by a standard neo-classical Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns
to scale:
(5) Yj = Tj Lj
α Kj
1-α ,
where Kj and Lj  stand for capital and labour inputs, accordingly and Tj is a measure of
productive efficiency.
As known, profit maximization yields:
(6)  α = swj ;
where swj is the share of labour costs in the total firm￿s costs.
From (5) and (6), the Solow residual which reflects the rate of change of total factor
productivity (denoted below as sj) in the case of perfect competition takes the well known
form of:
(7) sj =  d yj ￿ α (d lj) ￿  (1￿ α ) (d kj),
                                                                                                                                                       
1 As noted by Hall (1988), the equality between price and marginal cost is also a condition for the efficient
allocation of resources; conversely, a deviation from this condition implies allocative inefficiency.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 389
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where small letters stand for logarithms and ￿d￿ denotes the (logarithmic) differences
approximating growth rates.
In Hall￿s (1988) approach, the firm operates under imperfect competition and prices
deviate from marginal costs; he shows that in this case the Solow residual computed as (7)
can also be decomposed into:
(8) sj =  B (d yj ￿ d kj) + (1 ￿ B) dtj
where B is the above mentioned Lerner index.
In turn, Roeger (1995), using the dual cost function, has derived a similar expression
for the dual, or price based Solow residual s*j:
(9) s*j = ￿ d pj + α (d wj) + (1￿ α ) (d rj) = ￿ B (d pj ￿ d rj) + (1 ￿ B) dtj
where Pj , Wj and Rj denote firm￿s price, labour and capital costs, small letters stand for
logarithms and ￿d￿ for the logarithmic differences
He then subtracts (9) from (8) in which operation the last terms of the two right hand
expressions containing the efficiency term cancel out, and after some manipulation and
adding an error term, a simple expression is obtained which is at the same time very
convenient for estimation:
(10)  sj ￿ s*j =  (d yj + d pj) ￿ α (d lj + d wj) ￿  (1￿ α ) (d kj + d rj) =
   =  B [(d yj + d pj) ￿  (d kj + d rj) ] + εj
The sums in each of the small brackets are nothing else than the logarithmic
differences of the corresponding nominal values: d y*j = d yj + d pj; d l*j = d lj + d wj ; d k*j =
d kj + d rj , where Y*j, L*j and K*j denote the nominal values of value added, labour and
capital costs, accordingly and the small letters ￿ their logarithms.
Denoting:
(11) v*j =  d y*j ￿ α (d l*j) ￿  (1￿ α ) (d k*j)
(12) q*j =  d y*j ￿ d k*j,
the final expression for  the estimable equation becomes:William Davidson Institute Working Paper 389
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(13)  v*j =  B q*j + εj .
Another appealing feature in Roeger￿s transformation is that both prices and real
variables disappear in the final expressions and so this approach allows to estimate the mark-
up ratios directly from the nominal enterprise data without requiring the knowledge of
enterprise or sectoral prices. Also it overcomes the identification problems mentioned by Hall
(1988) which arise from the correlation between the explanatory variable and the error term.
Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) have developed further Roeger￿s
transformation to apply for a production function defined over sales and incorporating
material inputs as well.
2 For example, assume a Cobb-Douglas production function of the
type:
(14) Zj = Tj Lj
α MCj
β Kj
1-α-β ,
where Zj, Kj MCj and Lj  stand for real sales, capital, material inputs and labour inputs,
accordingly and Tj is the measure of productive efficiency.
Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) show that in this case the corresponding
expressions for v*j and q*j will take the form:
(15) v*j =  d z*j ￿ α (d l*j) ￿  β (d mc*j) ￿ (1- α - β) (d k*j) ,
(16) q*j =  d z*j ￿ d k*j,
where Z*j, K*j MC*j and L*j  stand for nominal sales, capital, material and labour costs,
accordingly, while the small letters stand for their logarithms and ￿d￿ for the logarithmic
difference; α = swj; β = smj are the shares of labour costs and of material costs in total costs,
In this case the derived estimable equation retains its form.
Roeger (1995) and further studies by Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) and
Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999) have used the above transformation to estimate
sectoral mark-up ratios on the basis of longitudal sectoral data (time series of aggregated
                                                
2 The literature is not unanimous on the issue which of the two specifications is more suitable for empirical
work.  However, as pointed out by Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996), some studies have shown that
defining the mark-up over value added may induce an upward bias in estimations.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 389
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sectoral data).  In principle, data allowing (at least two subsequent observations are needed in
order to compute the log-differences), there are no theoretical constraints on the application
of the above approach to pooled latitudal enterprise data (cross-section), or to mixed
enterprise data (panel data).  Moreover, this allows in addition to ease one of the possibly
rigid assumptions of Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995), incorporated also in all further empirical
studies, namely that the mark-ups are time-invariable.  In principle, by using cross-sectional
data, it is possible to compute mark-up ratios for each available data point.
3. Estimation of the mark-up ratios for Bulgarian manufacturing firms
We applied Roeger￿s transformation to estimate the mark-up ratios in Bulgarian
manufacturing by NACE 3-digit and NACE 2-digit sectors, on the basis of the available
enterprise data set.  We used the extension suggested by Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat
(1996) corresponding to the mark-up ratios pertaining to sales (implying a production
function which is defined over gross output and incorporating material inputs), which seems
to be less prone to estimation bias.
We use for this purpose balance sheet data for Bulgarian manufacturing enterprises
for the period 1995-1997, as reported to the National Statistical Institute (NSI).  An overview
of the full sample of Bulgarian manufacturing firms reported by the NSI, broken down by
NACE 2-digit sectors, is shown in table 1.  This sample is only restricted to firms that apply
the ￿double entry￿ book accounting standard as only this provides sufficiently detailed
breakdown of performance indicators (as needed for our analysis).
3  Firms in table 1 are
defined as private if a majority stake was in private ownership as of the end of the
corresponding year (these include both privatized and newly formed private firms); the rest
are defined as SOEs.
The estimation procedure is pretty straightforward.  First v*j and q*j are calculated for
each enterprise as shown in (15) and (16) from the individual enterprise data for two adjacent
periods.  As noted above, only nominal (current price) data are needed for this operation.
Then equation (13) is estimated, by selected categories of firms such as manufacturing
sectors or another pre-selected sub-set of enterprises.  The estimated coefficient of the q*
                                                
3 Consequently some private firms (notably individual entrepreneurs) are excluded in our data set altogether.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 389
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variable is nothing else than the implied Lerner index.  Afterwards, we can calculate
backwards the sectoral mark-up ratios θi as shown in (4).
This procedure implies homogeneity of the production technology across the sub-sets
of firms for which equation (13) is estimated, and the final result is the average mark-up over
marginal cost defined for this pre-specified category of firms.  Due to the implications of
eventual non-homogeneity of the implied production technology across firms, it is preferable
to perform sectoral estimations at a lower level of sectoral disaggregation where it is more
likely that this condition would be observed.  On the other hand, the sheer number of firms
for which data are available becomes a binding lower constraint because already at the NACE
3-digit level there are sectors which are rather under-represented in terms of the number of
firms.
Taking into account these conflicting considerations, the above procedure has been
applied in two sets of estimations:
1. To estimate the mark-up ratios by NACE 3-digit manufacturing sectors, on the
basis of the data for all firms (without discriminating between different categories of firms
within the manufacturing sectors).  This set of estimations aims at evaluating the average
mark-up ratios at the possibly lowest level of disaggregation and the results are given in table
2.
2. To estimate the mark-up ratios by NACE 2-digit sectors, in three versions: a) on the
basis of the data for all firms (without discriminating between different categories within
manufacturing sectors); b) for the subset of SOEs within each  NACE 2-digit sector; c) for
the subset of private firms within each  NACE 2-digit sector.  This set of estimations seeks to
distinguish between the pricing patterns of the two main categories of firms (SOEs and
private).  The results are shown in table 3.
The available data only allow to perform these estimations from 1995 onwards and
due to the fact that two adjacent years are needed to estimate the mark-ups in one year, this
has reduced the time period to two years: 1996 and 1997.  Accordingly, the estimations of
equation (15) have been performed separately for each of these years and for a two-year
panel.
Due to the implied relationship with the elasticity of demand (2), the mark-up ratio
only has a meaningful and straightforward economic interpretation in the case when it is > 1.
As can be seen in the results shown in tables 2 and 3, this has not always been the case in the
ratios estimated for the sectoral ratios.  Nevertheless, such results are shown in the tables as,
because of the rough character of the data and the small number of observations in someWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 389
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cases, a possible downward estimation bias may well be within the margin of error.  The
blanks in the tables are for sectors with no observations (firms) or where a very small number
of observations has resulted in implausible degrees of freedom, making the estimation
impossible.  In a very few number of cases the results were discarded due to very low
statistical significance; such sectoral results are not shown in table 7 either.
As to the possibility of an estimation bias, Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat
(1996) have shown that under the assumption of constant returns to scale, Roeger￿s approach
provides for an unbiased estimate of the Lerner index. However they, as well as Hylleberg
and Jłrgensen (1998), point out that the presence of increasing returns of scale may result in
an downward bias in the estimation of the mark-up and vice versa, decreasing returns to scale
may cause an upward bias in the estimation.
Previous studies of Bulgarian enterprise performance (Dobrinsky, Dochev and
Markov, 2001) have come up with estimates of returns to scale slightly higher than 1
suggesting that Bulgarian firms in this period operated under increasing returns to scale but
this factor was not significantly larger than 1.  Such an assumption would lead us to suspect a
possible downward bias in the estimated mark-ups.  On the other hand, if the measured
increasing returns to scale are themselves the result of an estimation bias, and the true returns
are assumed as constant, then the estimation risks regarding the mark-ups will be reduced.
Regarding the actual level of the computed mark-ups, to the best of the authors￿
knowledge, so far similar estimates for Bulgaria have not been documented in the literature,
so there is no basis for a critical comparison.  On the other hand, the estimated numerical
values of the mark-up ratios for Bulgarian manufacturing firms compare favourably with
similar results for other transition economies like Hungary (Halpern and Kőr￿si, 2001).  Our
results are also comparable in level with the sectoral mark-up ratios for the OECD countries
computed by Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996).
The results presented in table 3 allow a comparison of the pricing policy of SOEs and
private firms (as noted, due to the limited number of firms, such a breakdown could only be
made at the NACE 2-digit level).  Notably, these results do not indicate any systematic
deviations in the pricing patterns of these two categories of firms.  This is a somewhat
counterintuitive finding, as in the transition literature it has usually been taken for granted
that SOEs (especially large enterprises) are more likely to enjoy a monopolistic position on
the domestic market.  Consequently, assuming that SOEs tend to engage more often in
monopolistic mark-up pricing practices one would expect to find higher mark-up ratios for
the sub-set of SOE than for the sub-set of private firms.  In contrast, our results do notWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 389
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provide any systematic evidence of this happening.  There are indeed cases when the
computed sectoral mark-ups are higher than those of the private firms but there are also the
examples of the opposite happening.
4. Competitive pressure and mark-up pricing
As noted above, by its theoretical definition, the mark-up ratio reflects the pricing
policy of firms endowed with market power who use that power to set prices higher than their
marginal costs.  Hence, looked from the opposite angle, if the mark-up ratios are  measurable,
then they themselves can be regarded as reflecting the degree of competition that firms are
facing on the market.  In terms of the empirical statistics used in the framework of our study,
such a conjecture would at least imply a positive statistical association between the measured
sectoral marukps and the measures of sectoral competitive pressure.
To test this conjecture, we formulate and estimate a ￿mark-up price equation￿ which
seeks to explain the cross-sector variation in mark-up ratios through variables measuring
competitive pressure within manufacturing sectors.  Admittedly, in the absence of a proper
structural model such an approach has limited analytical power as it is not backed by
underlying structural relationships and hence the estimated relationships can only be
interpreted in their statistical sense.  At the same time such an approach may provide some
further clues both as to the overall consistency of the approach and to the adequacy and
proper measurement of the mark-ups.
The idea is then to specify the ￿mark-up price equation￿ in a form that would allow to
analyze (and judge) whether competitive pressure/market power within sectors has a
statistically meaningful effect on the price formation in the sectors (as reflected by the
computed mark-ups) and if yes, which are the main factors that affect the level of the mark-
ups.  For this purpose we use as dependent variable the estimated in the previous step mark-
up ratios which should in principle reflect the average addition to marginal costs charged by
the firms within individual sectors. As to the independent variables, we use a set of
competition variables described below.
We therefore specify a sectoral mark-up price equation for sector i as follows:
(17) θi =  bi0 + bi1 Ci  + bi2 Mi  + bi3 Di  + bi4 Ei  + bi5 Oi  + εi,William Davidson Institute Working Paper 389
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where the following competition variables are used:
Ci  is a measure of the concentration of firms in sector i (variable ci3 , the share of the
three largest firms in total sectoral sales, was used in the actual estimations). The expected
sign of the coefficient is positive.
Mi is the import penetration ratio in sector i.  The sign of the coefficient of this
variable is undefined.  If the degree of import penetration is assumed to indicate higher
competition, then the coefficient should have a negative sign.  However, if importers
themselves are endowed with market power, the sign may be positive.
Di is the average long-term debt ratio in sector i. We assume as above that this
indicator mirrors financial pressure on heavily indebted firms and, possibly, the incidence of
soft budget constraints reducing competitive pressure.  In this interpretation, the expected
sign is positive.
Oi is the share of the sales by state-owned firms in the total sales in sector i.  If private
ownership is assumed to be associated with better governance and proper incentive structures
(and hence higher competitive pressure), then the expected sign of the coefficient of this
variable is positive.
Ei is the average ratio of exports to sales in sector i.  Assuming as above that larger
exposure to the international markets is indicative of higher competitive pressure, the
coefficient of this variable can be expected to be positive.  However, what we observe in our
data is the aggregate pricing policy of these firms (covering exports as well as domestic sales)
and since exporting firms may have discriminating pricing policies on these two segments of
their market, there may be more ambiguity as to this aggregate outcome.
The estimation results for the mark-up price equation specified as above for NACE 3-
digit manufacturing sectors are shown in table 4.  Given the data limitations, the equation was
estimated for 1996 and 1997 (single years) and for a 1996-1997 panel, using OLS.  Besides,
two versions of these estimations are reported in table 4: a) using all computed mark-ups
reported in table 2 (including those < 1); b) using only mark-ups > 1.  As noted, in principle
only the latter have a meaningful economic interpretation (version b)).  In view of the
argument in the previous section, version a) assumes that the ratios estimated as < 1 contain a
large margin of error but have captured correctly the relative positioning of the value of the
actual mark-up.
In general, the estimation results for the mark-up price equation presented in table 4
can be regarded as satisfactory in terms of the measured direction of impact.  TheWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 389
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concentration variable was estimated with a negative sign (again counter to the expected) but
the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient is low (only for the full sample panel it
is significant at the 10% level).  The coefficient of the import penetration variable is always
positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level).  In terms of the argument above, this
would suggest that foreign firms operating on the domestic market tend to enjoy substantial
market power which allows them to set monopolistic prices while local firms follow suit.
The coefficient of the debt variable is always estimated with a positive sign (in conformity
with expectations) and is also statistically significant.  This could be interpreted as evidence
that financial pressure (and the implied soft budget constraints) is associated with price-
setting practices similar to the monopolistic ones.
As to the variables reflecting export activity and the ownership effect, in most cases
the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant while the signs vary in the different
versions.  In line with expectation, in most cases the estimated coefficients of the ownership
variable are positive and for 1997 they are also statistically significant, implying that SOEs
firms in that year were more likely to engage in monopolistic price-setting practices.
However, most of the coefficients of the ownership variable are not statistically significant,
so the estimation results do not provide strong empirical support for this type of argument.
As regards the export variable, in more cases this coefficient is negative, but its statistical
significance is very low.
5. Conclusions
The competition literature argues strongly that when firms are subject to growing
competitive pressure, they are motivated to seek ways to enhance their allocative and
productive efficiency.  Theory also suggests that a competitive environment in well
functioning markets is not only propitious for the firms￿ productive and allocative efficiency
but also contributes to the establishment of efficient price-setting mechanisms which are
beneficial for consumers as well.  Competitive pricing and efficiency are in fact the two sides
of one and the same coin.
The transition from plan to market provides an excellent testing ground to test the
validity of some of these assumptions and theoretical derivations as the local firms have been
facing growing competitive pressures due to the liberalization and opening up of theseWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 389
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economies.  In this paper we attempted to address empirically some aspects of the ongoing
process of enterprise restructuring and adjustment in Bulgaria focusing on the impact of
competitive pressure on the pricing policies of Bulgarian manufacturing firms.
The pricing policy of Bulgarian manufacturing firms was analyzed in the paper in the
context of the theory of the price-setting behaviour of firms endowed with market power, and
more specifically, using the notion of mark-up pricing.  Using some recent derivations in the
literature, we estimate mark-up ratios for Bulgarian manufacturing sectors at the NACE 2-
digit and NACE 3-digit levels.  These estimates have empirical value in themselves, as this
aspect of the pricing policy of firms in the transition economies has not been elaborated
sufficiently in the literature.
As the sectoral mark-up ratios should reflect the degree of competition that firms are
facing within each sector, the paper then goes to test the estimated mark-ups against a set of
variables measuring the degree of competitive pressure on a sectoral level.  Again, the
estimated mark-up equations in the main provide evidence supporting the conjecture that the
stronger market competition is a conducive environment for efficient price setting.  At the
same time, some ambiguity remains as regards the impact of some competition-related
variables (such as ownership and exposure to external markets) on the pricing policies of
Bulgarian manufacturing firms.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 389
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Table 1. The sample of Bulgarian manufacturing enterprises: number of firms by NACE 2-digit sectors and ownership categories
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
NACE  2-digit sectors SOEs Private Total SOEs Private Total SOEs Private Total SOEs Private Total SOEs Private Total
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 372 93 465 380 562 942 380 1150 1530 221 1555 1776 149 1858 2007
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 21 1 22 22 3 25 22 9 31 20 7 27 21 9 30
17 Manufacture of textiles and textile products 126 22 148 127 60 187 125 121 246 51 200 251 40 226 266
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel and fur products 142 110 252 144 279 423 144 582 726 63 790 853 49 946 995
19 Manufacture of leather products, luggage and footwear 43 22 65 43 55 98 42 102 144 13 154 167 10 186 196
20 Manufacture of wood products (except furniture) 75 35 110 76 111 187 82 361 443 40 487 527 27 493 520
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 28 19 47 29 49 78 28 93 121 16 113 129 14 151 165
22 Publishing, printing and recorded media 89 21 110 91 288 379 85 495 580 75 566 641 60 618 678
23 Manufacture of coke and petroleum products 505448448189 99
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 72 14 86 74 74 148 71 207 278 42 275 317 33 317 350
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 50 12 62 52 77 129 49 286 335 25 364 389 18 364 382
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 128 14 142 128 64 192 138 141 279 78 221 299 64 245 309
27 Manufacture of basic metals 52 9 61 59 26 85 58 56 114 29 82 111 27 91 118
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products 166 38 204 174 177 351 175 523 698 98 625 723 79 656 735
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 282 12 294 285 166 451 312 406 718 159 608 767 130 699 829
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 15 0 15 21 32 53 17 61 78 9 89 98 8 80 88
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus 75 6 81 75 62 137 73 182 255 39 224 263 34 255 289
32 Manufacture of radio, TV and communication equipment 38 3 41 40 51 91 47 103 150 32 122 154 26 125 151
33 Manufacture of precision and optical instruments 52 1 53 51 56 107 50 112 162 39 136 175 32 168 200
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles and trailers 26 2 28 27 11 38 23 40 63 12 52 64 11 59 70
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 15 1 16 17 26 43 28 46 74 17 58 75 8 73 81
36 Manufacture of furniture 112 40 152 115 147 262 108 309 417 48 422 470 37 439 476
3 7  R e c y c l i n g 40440413416719 1 0
Total 1988 475 2463 2038 2380 4418 2062 5392 7454 1128 7164 8292 878 8076 8954
Source: National Statistical Institute.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 399
Table 2. Estimated mark-up ratios for Bulgarian manufacturing sectors at NACE3-digit level.
NACE
sectors
1996 1997 1996-97
panel
NACE
sectors
1996 1997 1996-97
panel
Mark-up
ratios
Mark-up
ratios
Mark-up
ratios
Mark-up
ratios
Mark-up
ratios
Mark-up
ratios
151 1.100 ** 1.138 ** 1.135 ** 268 1.023 1.141 ** 1.130 **
152 0.981 0.971 271 0.940 1.428 * 1.233
153 1.218 ** 1.237 ** 1.235 ** 272 0.966 1.062 * 1.043
154 1.445 ** 1.346 ** 1.351 ** 273 1.139 ** 1.044 1.077 **
155 1.077 ** 1.047 ** 1.050 ** 274 0.984 1.108 * 1.102 **
156 1.248 ** 1.505 ** 1.494 ** 275 1.394 ** 1.060 1.113 **
157 1.116 ** 1.097 ** 1.102 ** 281 1.138 ** 1.121 ** 1.121 **
158 1.026 1.101 ** 1.094 ** 282 1.389 ** 1.190 ** 1.215 **
159 1.658 ** 1.082 ** 1.132 ** 283 0.910 1.158 1.151 *
160 1.284 ** 1.098 ** 1.175 ** 284 1.370 ** 1.523 ** 1.517 **
171 1.015 1.041 1.038 285 1.146 ** 1.061 1.078 **
172 1.121 ** 1.119 ** 1.119 ** 286 1.151 ** 1.197 ** 1.193 **
174 1.029 1.396 ** 1.371 ** 287 1.092 ** 1.056 ** 1.060 **
175 1.064 1.100 ** 1.092 ** 291 1.145 ** 1.114 ** 1.116 **
176 1.372 1.372 292 1.114 ** 1.176 ** 1.170 **
177 1.032 1.153 ** 1.144 ** 293 1.285 ** 1.196 ** 1.210 **
181 1.287 1.137 1.160 294 1.166 ** 1.210 ** 1.209 **
182 1.144 ** 1.148 ** 1.148 ** 295 1.052 ** 1.167 ** 1.149 **
183 1.281 ** 1.259 ** 1.261 ** 296 1.412 1.248 ** 1.249 **
191 0.987 1.049 1.046 297 1.045 1.068 ** 1.067 **
192 0.948 1.110 ** 1.105 ** 300 1.426 ** 1.164 ** 1.173 **
193 1.172 ** 1.098 ** 1.103 ** 311 1.018 1.127 ** 1.117 **
201 1.118 ** 1.171 ** 1.167 ** 312 1.106 ** 1.122 ** 1.121 **
202 1.006 1.054 1.049 313 0.976 1.190 1.181 *
203 1.104 ** 1.067 ** 1.069 ** 314 0.977 0.973 0.973
204 1.072 1.055 1.056 * 315 0.965 1.100 ** 1.093 **
205 1.705 * 1.042 1.058 316 1.031 1.167 ** 1.160 **
211 1.040 1.574 ** 1.556 ** 321 1.876 ** 1.708 ** 1.718 **
212 1.018 1.089 ** 1.084 ** 322 3.447 ** 1.708 ** 1.931 **
221 1.010 1.176 ** 1.172 ** 323 1.094 1.312 ** 1.280 **
222 0.993 1.144 ** 1.137 ** 331 1.066 1.141 ** 1.132 **
223 0.951 0.976 332 1.058 1.127 ** 1.120 **
232 0.809 1.046 1.011 333 13.782 * 2.706 ** 2.773 **
241 1.090 ** 1.080 ** 334 1.465 * 1.368 ** 1.370 **
242 1.002 0.990 1.008 335 1.139
243 1.141 1.180 ** 1.179 ** 341 1.401 1.894 ** 1.888 **
244 1.087 1.188 ** 1.174 ** 342 1.789 ** 1.269 ** 1.298 **
245 1.048 1.133 ** 1.130 ** 343 1.228 ** 1.083 * 1.091 **
246 2.423 ** 1.606 ** 1.653 ** 351 1.626 ** 1.172 ** 1.223 **
247 0.620 0.959 0.958 352 1.091 * 1.070
251 1.141 ** 1.215 ** 1.213 ** 353 8.241
252 1.087 ** 1.190 ** 1.185 ** 354 1.082 1.084
261 0.990 1.011 1.009 355 0.743 **
262 1.109 1.071 ** 1.076 ** 361 1.088 ** 1.081 ** 1.082 **
263 1.280 ** 1.109 1.199 ** 362 1.029 0.982 0.984
264 1.104 ** 1.053 ** 1.068 ** 364 0.744 1.020 0.991
265 0.963 1.245 ** 1.191 ** 365 1.269 1.509 ** 1.495
266 1.055 1.035 ** 1.038 ** 366 1.583 ** 1.091 ** 1.112
267 1.086 1.226 ** 1.216 ** 372 1.257 * 1.257
** - significant at the 5% significance level; * -  significant at the 10% significance level
Note: The significance levels refer to the Lerner indices estimated in accordance with equation (15).  For
details see text.
Source: Authors￿ calculationsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 399
Table 3. Estimated mark-up ratios for Bulgarian manufacturing sectors at NACE 2-digit level by ownership categories.
NACE
sectors
  All firms SOEs Private firms
1996 1997 1996-1997
panel
1996 1997 1996-1997
panel
1996 1997 1996-1997
panel
15 1.168 ** 1.057 ** 1.066 ** 1.133 ** 1.042 ** 1.056 ** 1.203 ** 1.066 ** 1.072 **
16 1.059 0.916 0.975 1.267 ** 1.000 1.066 ** 0.888 1.077
17 1.066 ** 1.078 ** 1.077 ** 1.104 ** 1.018 1.029 ** 0.981 1.136 ** 1.127 **
18 1.061 ** 1.053 ** 1.054 ** 1.242 ** 1.075 ** 1.102 ** 1.071 ** 1.103 ** 1.101 **
19 1.051 1.043 * 1.044 ** 1.169 ** 1.025 1.043 ** 1.069 1.088 ** 1.088 **
20 1.062 ** 1.072 ** 1.071 ** 1.122 ** 1.063 * 1.072 ** 1.125 ** 1.044 1.046 *
21 1.038 1.128 ** 1.123 ** 1.065 1.326 ** 1.307 ** 0.977 1.063 * 1.059 **
22 1.017 1.086 ** 1.084 ** 0.971 1.002 0.998 0.903 1.109 ** 1.108 **
23 1.362 1.031 1.102 0.881 1.026 0.983 1.947 1.947
24 1.152 ** 1.027 1.035 1.233 ** 1.139 ** 1.149 ** 0.969 1.097 ** 1.093 **
25 1.115 ** 1.173 ** 1.171 ** 1.100 ** 1.017 1.028 ** 1.061 1.206 ** 1.204 **
26 0.979 1.011 1.005 1.137 ** 1.068 ** 1.080 ** 0.992 1.045 ** 1.035 **
27 1.354 ** 0.915 ** 0.975 1.334 ** 1.040 1.088 ** 1.012 1.077 * 1.065 *
28 1.171 ** 1.123 ** 1.127 ** 1.172 ** 1.042 ** 1.065 ** 1.149 ** 1.067 ** 1.069 **
29 1.043 ** 1.059 ** 1.058 ** 1.179 ** 1.073 ** 1.088 ** 1.020 ** 1.081 ** 1.079 **
30 1.094 1.005 1.008 1.484 ** 1.070 1.119 * 1.000 1.000
31 1.010 1.116 ** 1.108 ** 1.027 1.044 ** 1.041 ** 1.436 * 1.055 ** 1.055 **
32 1.522 ** 1.117 ** 1.159 ** 2.642 ** 1.447 ** 1.565 ** 1.725 ** 1.314 ** 1.341 **
33 1.054 1.036 1.037 1.565 ** 1.067 ** 1.127 ** 1.079 ** 1.079 **
34 1.188 ** 0.988 0.999 1.429 ** 1.237 ** 1.259 ** 2.773 ** 1.107 * 1.120 **
35 1.212 * 1.103 1.114 * 1.346 ** 1.090 ** 1.124 ** 1.069 1.069
36 1.073 ** 1.042 * 1.045 ** 1.106 ** 1.007 1.018 1.100 ** 1.101 ** 1.101 **
** - significant at the 5% significance level; * -  significant at the 10% significance level
Note: The significance levels refer to the Lerner indices estimated in accordance with equation (15).  For details see text.
Source: Authors￿ calculationsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 399
Table 4. OLS estimations of the mark-up equation
Dependent variable: price mark-up ratios at NACE 3-digit level
(t-statistics in parentheses)
==========================================================================
Estimated             All sectors               Sectors with positive
sample                                              mark-up ratios
Year/period     1996      1997   1996-97       1996      1997   1996-97
                                  panel                         panel
Number of
observations     81        85      166          66        80      146
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Constant       1.115**   1.066**   1.094**    1.094**   1.049**   1.032**
              (6.722)  (20.894)  (16.595)    (5.660)  (20.953)  (14.845)
ci3           -0.274     -0.091   -0.157*    -0.023    -0.048    -0.044
             (-1.476)   (-1.230) (-1.733)   (-0.095)  (-0.655)  (-0.449)
M              0.389**    0.219**  0.294**    0.359**   0.219**   0.273**
              (2.314)    (3.429)  (3.540)    (1.821)   (3.492)   (3.111)
D              0.640**    0.469**  0.565**    0.538*    0.448**   0.518**
              (2.477)    (2.759)  (3.549)    (1.862)   (2.711)   (3.162)
OD             0.047      0.154**  0.067     -0.075     0.182**   0.113
              (0.218)    (2.558)  (0.986)   (-0.265)   (3.028)   (1.552)
ED            -0.035     -0.018   -0.050      0.108    -0.036     0.002
             (-0.163)   (-0.192) (-0.431)    (0.403)  (-0.379)   (0.018)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adjusted R2    0.116      0.213    0.138      0.049     0.251     0.121
==========================================================================
** -  significant at the 5% significance level;
*   -  significant at the 10% significance level.
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